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REFLECTIONS ON THE SECURITIES
BROKER AS A FIDUCIARY
Norman S. Poser*
LAN Bromberg and I were colleagues for many years. We en-
tered Harvard College together just when World War II was
ending. Many years later, SMU Law School, I believe at Alan's
urging, invited me to join its faculty. Though I declined because of family
reasons, I recall with pleasure Alan's gracious hospitality when I was in
Dallas, and his comfortable living room, filled with Native American arti-
facts. I should also mention that Alan and Lew Lowenfels are the co-
authors of a magisterial treatise on securities and commodities fraud. It is
only fitting that this short article, written in Alan's memory, should focus
on the protection of investors.
The Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank or the Act), enacted by Congress in
2010, gives the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC or the
Commission) authority to adopt rules requiring securities brokers to act
in the best interest of their retail customers when giving them personal-
ized investment advice about securities.' In Dodd-Frank, Congress left it
up to the SEC whether to require broker-dealers to act as fiduciaries.
Although Representative Barney Frank, one of the two sponsors of the
bill, announced: "we expect them [the SEC] to impose greater fiduciary
responsibilities on [broker-dealers]," 2 the SEC has failed to do so. As of
September 2015, nearly five years have passed since the passage of the
Act, and the SEC has not yet proposed any such rules. The purpose of
this short article is to examine the concept of fiduciary duty as applied to
broker-dealer firms, to inquire into the reasons for the Commission's in-
action, and to suggest what should happen in the future.
When Congress considered the legislation that became Dodd-Frank, it
heard testimony concerning numerous abuses by securities brokers and
dealers, including situations where "[f]or at least two years, the largest
broker-dealer firms made a practice of betraying their customers by pub-
* Professor of Law Emeritus, Brooklyn Law School. I thank James A. Fanto and
Susan Poser for their helpful comments on a draft of this article; however, the opinions
expressed, and any errors, are my own. I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of
John Garcia, a member of the graduating class of 2015 at Brooklyn Law School.
1. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the
U.S.C.).
2. 156 CONG. REC. H5212-03 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Frank),
available at 2010 WL 2605428.
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lishing tainted research reports, apparently without the SEC noticing."'3
In Section 913(g), Congress focused on the difference between the stan-
dard of conduct applicable to investment advisers and to broker-dealers,
although both categories of securities professionals engage in the same
type of business activity: giving investment advice to customers about
securities.
Most investment advisers are required to register with the SEC under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.4 As long ago as 1963, the Supreme
Court held that investment advisers have a fiduciary relationship with
their clients. The Court stated that the 1940 Act "reflects a congressional
recognition of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory re-
lationship, as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to
expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment ad-
viser-consciously or unconsciously-to render advice which is not
disinterested." 5
Broker-dealer firms are not subject to any such fiduciary standard
under the federal securities laws. Most broker-dealers must register with
the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
Act").6 They are prohibited from engaging in fraud or manipulation,7 and
they are subject to the rules of the federally authorized self-regulatory
organizations (SRO). 8 The SROs, the most important of which is the Fi-
nancial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), regulate the ethical
practices of their members. 9 Most broker-dealer firms are required to be
FINRA members. FINRA requires its members and their sales forces,
among other things, to observe ethical practices, 10 requires them to know
3. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Hearing Before the S. Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, 110th Cong. (2010) (statement of Denise Voigt Crawford, President, North
American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.), available at 2010 WL 125994. For a
description of many of the abuses that led to enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, see Nor-
man S. Poser, Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulation, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 289 (2009).
4. Section 202(a)(11)(C) excludes from the definition of "investment adviser" "any
broker or dealer whose performance of [investment advisory] services is solely incidental
to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensa-
tion therefor." Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2013).
5. SEC v. Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. 180, 190-91 (1963). In some respects,
broker-dealers are regulated more extensively than investment advisers. For example,
there is no self-regulatory organization regulating investment advisers, as there is for bro-
ker-dealers. For a detailed comparison between the regulation of the two classes of securi-
ties professionals, see James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Analysis of
the Legal Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and a Framework for
Enhanced Investor Protection, 68 Bus. LAW. 1 (2012).
6. Exchange Act, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012).
7. Exchange Act, §§ 9(a), 10(b), 15(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a), 78j(b), 78o(c) (2012).
8. Exchange Act, §§ 6, 15A, 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o, 78s (2012).
9. In FINRA-operated arbitrations, breach of fiduciary duty is the most common
claim asserted by customers of brokerage firms. NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, 2
BROKER-DEALER LAW & REGULATION 16-9 (4th ed. 2011).
10. FINRA Rule 2010 provides: "A member, in the conduct of its business, shall ob-
serve high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade."
FINRA R. 2010, Standards of Commercial Honor and Principles of Trade, FINRA (2015),
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the essential facts about their customers," and prohibits them from rec-
ommending unsuitable securities to a customer. 12 While FINRA exer-
cises an important regulatory function, it is subject to a significant
limitation: because it is not an arm of the government, it lacks subpoena
power and therefore cannot compel the production of essential testimony
and documents by non-members, including persons outside the securities
industry.' 3 Furthermore, since FINRA and other SROs are membership
organizations (though FINRA is administered by full-time officers and
employees), there is a potential tension between the interests of their
memberships and the regulatory role of the SRO. As a result, SROs are
sometimes less than diligent in regulating their members.
1 4
Although the Exchange Act gives the SEC authority to regulate many
of the activities of brokerage firms, including short selling,15 the handling
of customers' cash and securities,' 6 and financial responsibility,1 7 it does
not give the SEC any express authority to regulate the conduct of brokers
in dealing with their customers. Nearly forty years ago, Professor Louis
Loss of the Harvard Law School, as the Reporter for a Federal Securities
Code sponsored by the American Law Institute, proposed to fill this reg-
ulatory gap. The Code, drafted over a period of eight years, was designed
to be a uniform statute that would replace the five principal securities
laws, but it was never enacted. Nevertheless, Professor Loss's proposal
regarding the regulation of brokers' conduct is instructive. The Code
would have given the SEC the authority to adopt rules prohibiting any
conduct by a broker, dealer, or investment adviser "that constitutes un-
fair dealing with a customer, client, or subscriber.' 8 A Note explained
that the purpose of this provision was "to carve out a degree of miscon-
duct that is more than 'unethical,' so that it is within the proper sphere of




11. FINRA Rule 2090 provides in part: "Every member shall use reasonable diligence,
in regard to the opening and maintenance of every account, to know (and retain) the es-
sential facts concerning every customer." FINRA R. 2090, Know Your Customer, FINRA
(2015), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&el
ementid=9858.
12. FINRA Rule 2111(a) provides in part: "A member or an associated person must
have a reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy
involving a security or securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information
obtained through the reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to ascertain
the customer's investment profile." FINRA R. 2111(a), Suitability, FINRA (2015), availa-
ble at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&elementid=98
59.
13. NORMAN S. POSER AND JAMES A. FANTO, 1 BROKER-DEALER LAW & REGULA-
TION 4-8 (4th ed. 2011).
14. For a rundown of regulatory failures by SROs, see id. at 4-10 to 4-15.
15. Exchange Act, § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (2012).
16. Id. §§ 8, 15(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h, 78o(c)(2) (2012).
17. Id. § 15(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (2012).
18. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FED. SEC. CODE § 915 (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
19. Id. at Note 1.
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The SEC has made efforts, not altogether unsuccessfully, to fill the reg-
ulatory gap between fraud and unethical conduct by expanding its defini-
tion of fraud. Early in its eighty-year history, the Commission developed
the theory that every broker, when he hangs out his shingle (i.e., enters
the securities business), makes an implied representation that he will deal
fairly with his customers and in accordance with the standards of his pro-
fession. Thus, any unfair dealings constitute a fraud because they violate
this implied representation. Although some courts adopted the so-called
"shingle theory, '20 its continuing validity has been questioned.21
A second theory that the SEC developed to fill the regulatory gap be-
tween antifraud rules and SRO rules became known as the "agency the-
ory." The SEC found that, where a customer had placed his trust and
confidence in the broker-dealer to act primarily for the customer's bene-
fit, an agency relationship existed between them, and the broker-dealer
had a duty to disclose its adverse interest in the transaction. Thus, the
SEC attempted to establish that a breach of fiduciary duty constituted a
fraud.22 Like the shingle theory, the agency theory was upheld by the
lower federal courts, 23 but it is questionable whether today's Supreme
Court, which is generally hostile to implied liabilities, would be willing to
stretch the concept of fraud to include a breach of fiduciary duty.24 As a
result, there are few, if any, modern decisions by federal courts finding a
broker-dealer or its employee liable based on either the shingle theory or
the agency theory.
The authority given to the SEC by Section 913(g) of the Dodd-Frank
Act requires brokers and dealers to prefer their retail customers over
themselves and may be seen as an attempt by Congress to fill, at least
partially, the regulatory gap in the securities laws and to create a uniform
standard of conduct that would apply both to broker-dealers and to in-
vestment advisers. In the congressional hearings and debates leading up
to enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, several witnesses and legislators
stressed the need for a uniform standard.25 It was also pointed out that
many investors did not know the difference between an investment ad-
viser and a broker, that the legal distinction between them was confusing
to investors, and that many investors thought that brokers already had a
20. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943).
21. In Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162
(2008), the Court suggested that the scope of federal securities fraud may actually be nar-
rower, not broader, than common law fraud. See also Roberta Karmel, Is the Shingle The-
ory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271 (1995).
22. The SEC held that broker-dealer rendering investment advice to a retail customer
is a fiduciary not only when it acts as an agent for the customer, but also when it sells
securities to the customer as principal. Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 674,
676 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966).
23. Id. at 672-73; Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 971, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
24. See, e.g., Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 148; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
25. See Commodity Exchange Changes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 110th
Cong. (2010) (testimony of Hon. Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission), available at 2010 WL 893874; 155 CONG. REc. E2970-01 (daily ed. Dec. 9,
2009) (speech of Rep. Melancon), available at 2009 WL 4729817.
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fiduciary relationship with their customers.26
Many organizations supported the imposition of a fiduciary duty on
broker-dealers.2 7 A senator stated: "There are not many that continue to
oppose imposition of a fiduciary duty. Insurance agents and the insurance
industry remain among the few that oppose this investor protection. ' 28
Adverting to the fact that the country was in a recession brought about,
at least in part, by the misconduct of securities professionals, one senator
stated that a full economic recovery could not be expected without restor-
ing the public's trust in the securities markets.29
Section 913(g) of the Dodd-Frank Act does not impose any new duties
on broker-dealers. Nor does it require the SEC to take any regulatory
action. Instead, it states that the SEC may adopt rules requiring broker-
dealers, when providing personalized investment advice about securities
to retail customers, to "act in the best interests of the customer without
regard to the financial other interest of the broker-dealer. 30 The rules, if
adopted by the SEC, must also provide that the standard of conduct ap-
plicable to broker-dealers "shall be no less stringent than the standard
applicable to investment advisers" under the Investment Advisers Act.31
Section 913(g) assures broker-dealers that the receipt of compensation
based on commissions (the typical form of compensation paid to broker-
age firms by retail customers) "shall not, in and of itself, be considered a
violation of such standard .... "32 It also provides, "Nothing in this sec-
tion shall require a broker or dealer or registered representative to have a
continuing duty of care or loyalty to the customer after providing person-
alized investment advice about securities. '33
26. 156 CONG. REC. S5870-02 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Akaka),
available at 2010 WL 2788025; 156 CONG. REC. H5233-01 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (state-
ment of Sen. Kanjorski), available at 2010 WL 2605437; 156 CONG. REC. S4034-02 (daily
ed. May 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Kaufman), available at 2010 WL 2010614.
27. The organizations mentioned included the American Associations of Retired Per-
sons, Consumer Federation of America, North American Securities Administrators Asso-
ciation, National Associations of Secretaries of State, National Governors Association,
National Association of Personal Financial Advisers, Council of Institutional Investors,
and Financial Planning Association. CONG. REC. S4034-02.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 913(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11 (2010).
31. Id.
32. Id.; Brokers' compensation in the form of commissions is a conflict of interest that
is embedded in the securities industry. Broker-dealers and their representatives who han-
dle customers' accounts get paid only if the customer makes a transaction. Under this com-
pensation system, "few brokers are immune to the temptation to consider their financial
interest from time to time while they are advising clients. Being at once a salesman and a
counselor is too much of a burden for most mortals." Albert Haas, Let's Put Brokers on a
Straight Salary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1977, at 12, quoted in Norman S. Poser, Options Ac-
count Fraud: Securities Churning in a New Context, 39 Bus. LAw. 571, 573 (1984).
33. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11. The last
sentence quoted above in the text appears to be designed to preserve the common law of
several states, which holds that a broker for a customer's nondiscretionary account nor-
mally does not have a continuing duty to monitor the account. See Caravan Mobile Home
Sales, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn, Loeb, Inc., 769 F.2d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1985); Leib v.
20151
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The scope of the SEC's rulemaking authority under Section 913(g) is
expressly limited to investment advice given to retail customers, and a
retail customer is defined as "a natural person, or the legal representative
of such natural person, who ... receives personalized investment advice
about securities from a broker, dealer, or investment adviser; and.., uses
such advice primarily for personal, family, or household purposes."34
Thus, Dodd-Frank implicitly denies the SEC the authority to require bro-
kers to act as fiduciaries when giving investment advice to their institu-
tional clients, such as churches, personal trusts, credit unions, college
endowment funds, foundations, school districts, and state and local gov-
ernments, as well as mutual funds and pension funds of all sizes.35
Under the well-established common law, "unless otherwise agreed, an
agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of
the principal in all matters connected with his agency." '36 An agent is sub-
ject to certain duties of care and loyalty that "go beyond mere fairness
and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the beneficiary's best inter-
ests."' 37 In the famous words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties
... Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensi-
tive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed
a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. 38
A securities broker typically performs several different kinds of ser-
vices for his customer, even within the confines of a single transaction,
requiring the broker to exercise his duties of care and loyalty to the cus-
tomer. The broker may give the customer investment advice, execute the
transaction for the customer, complete the transaction through the clear-
ing and settlement mechanism, act as custodian of the customer's funds
and securities, and provide credit to the customer for the purchase of
securities. Seen against the broad range of activities engaged in by bro-
ker-dealers on behalf of their customers, the scope of Section 913(g) of
Dodd-Frank is limited. It gives the SEC regulatory authority with respect
to only one of these brokerage functions, the providing of investment ad-
vice, and then only to the providing of advice to retail customers, i.e.,
customers who are natural persons. Within these limits, if the SEC
chooses to exercise the authority given to it by Section 913(g), the stan-
dard of conduct applicable to broker-dealers must be the same as the
fiduciary standard applicable to investment advisers.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1978), affd,
647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981).
34. Dodd-Frank Act, § 913(g)(2).
35. See Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommendations
to Institutional Investors, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1493, 1503 (2001).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
37. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 882 (1988).
38. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928).
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The importance of requiring brokers to place their customers' interests
above their own interests is manifest when one considers the potential for
abuse, as well as the history of abuse, in the broker-customer relation-
ship. The broker is likely to possess (or have access to) information about
companies and the markets that is not available to the customer. It is safe
to say that brokers, in seeking business, hold themselves out as experts in
giving their customers investment advice. That is their calling card. A re-
tail customer, by the very act of seeking advice, indicates that he likely
lacks the ability, background, or training to evaluate investment advice
given to him by his broker, thereby making the customer dependent on
the broker. This dependence itself is enough to justify the imposition of
fiduciary duties on the broker.
Under the fiduciary standard, the broker would be under a duty to dis-
close to his customer all information relevant to the transaction, which
may include such information as the following: that the broker has taken
a position in a stock he is recommending; that he is in possession of ad-
verse information about the issuer of such stock; that he is receiving a
special commission for recommending the stock; that there is a degree of
risk of buying the stock; or that he has not investigated the stock before
recommending it.
State law differs as to the circumstances under which a broker is con-
sidered to be his customer's fiduciary. The clear weight of authority is
that where a broker has discretionary authority to buy and sell securities
for his customer's account, the broker is in a fiduciary relationship with
the customer. 39 In some jurisdictions, a broker is not a fiduciary unless
the customer has given him discretionary authority.4 0 In other jurisdic-
tions, the existence of a fiduciary relationship may depend on one or
more of several factors, including: whether the broker exercises control
over the account;41 whether there is a long-standing relationship between
the broker and the customer;42 the investment sophistication of the cus-
tomer;43 whether the customer reposed trust and confidence in the bro-
ker;44 the complexity or riskiness of the securities traded; 45 or whether
the customer relied on a third party for investment advice. 46 The differ-
ences among the states on the nature of the relationship between broker
and customer makes the need for a federal rule all the more imperative.
While giving the SEC the authority to require broker-dealers to act as
fiduciaries when giving personalized investment advice to retail custom-
39. McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 766 (3d Cir. 1990).
40. Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 1996).
41. Newitt v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 607 S.E.2d 188, 196 (Ga. 2004).
42. Flickinger v. Harold C. Brown & Co., Inc., 947 F.2d 595, 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1991).
43. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng, 697 F. Supp. 1224, 1226
(D.D.C. 1988).
44. DeRance, Inc. v. PaineWebber, Inc., 872 F.2d 1312, 1321 (7th Cir. 1989).
45. Arthur Joseph Lewis, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29794, 49 SEC Docket 1487
(Oct. 8, 1991), available at 1991 WL 294317.




ers, Dodd-Frank also ensured Commission delay, by requiring it to con-
duct a detailed study of the subject, to seek public comment, and to
report back to Congress within six months.47 The SEC staff conducted
such a study and, after receiving over 3,500 comments from members of
the public, wrote a report with recommendations to the Commission.48
Unsurprisingly, the many investment advisers who submitted comments
favored rules that would subject broker-dealers to the higher standards of
conduct already imposed on investment advisers. In January 2011, six
months after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the SEC staff submitted a
report to the Commission, recommending that the SEC establish a uni-
form fiduciary standard for investment advisers and broker-dealers when
providing investment advice to retail customers. 49
Another two years went by before the Commission took any action,
and then it was again to solicit comments from the public.50 The Commis-
sion explained this second solicitation was necessary because few com-
mentators provided cost-benefit data.51 While it is beyond the scope of
this article to summarize the many responses received by the Commission
to its second solicitation for comments, one stands out for its clarity-and
for its demand for clarity-from the SEC: an individual who identified
himself as a registered representative with a firm that was both an invest-
ment adviser and a broker-dealer wrote: "I encourage you at the SEC to
demonstrate some real backbone and thus lead on this matter to adopt a
COMMON FIDUCIARY STANDARD FOR THE FINANCIAL SER-
VICES INDUSTRY. '52
The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA),
the trade organization of the securities industry, which claims to "bring
... together the shared interests of hundreds of securities firms, banks
and asset managers," wrote to the SEC that it supported a uniform stan-
dard, but added that its support "[was] predicated upon appropriate cost-
benefit analysis and implementation of the standard in a manner that pre-
serves investor choice, is cost-effective and business model neutral, and
avoids regulatory duplication or conflict."'53 Thus, three years after the
enactment of Dodd-Frank, and after two requests for public comment to
the SEC, the securities industry asked for more study on the subject. And
after two more years, the SEC has not, as of September 2015, proposed
47. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012).
48. See U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N STAFF, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS (2011) [hereinafter "SEC Staff Study"], available at https://www.sec.
gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
49. Id. at ii.
50. Sec. & Exch. Act Release No. 34-69013, (Mar. 1, 2013), available at https://www.
sec.gov/rules/other/2013/34-69013.pdf.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Sec. & Exch. Act Release No. 34-69013, Comment submitted by Les E. Vicain Jr.
(July 1, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-3095.pdf.
53. Sec. & Exch. Act Release No. 34-69013, Comment submitted by SIFMA at 1, 24
(July 5, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-3128.pdf.
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any rules under Section 913(g). If Congress intended to kick the can of
fiduciary duty down the street, it succeeded beyond all expectation.
The SEC's apparent reluctance to adopt investor-protection rules that
Congress authorized, even if it did not mandate, is not easy to explain.
The idea that a broker should prefer his customers' interests over his own
interests seems like a no-brainer. SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated pub-
licly in March 2015 that it was her "personal view" that the SEC should
implement the uniform fiduciary standards authorized by Dodd-Frank.
54
Yet Chair White added, "You have to think long and hard before you
regulate differently."' 55 A month earlier, President Barack Obama placed
the prestige of the White House squarely behind the notion that broker-
dealers are fiduciaries, when he publicly called on the Department of La-
bor to "update the rules and requirements that retirement advisors put
the best interests of their clients above their own financial interests ....
It's a very simple principle. You want to give financial advice, you've got
to put your client's interests first. You can't have a conflict of interest.
'56
Shortly afterwards, the Labor Department released a proposed rule for
public comment, which would impose fiduciary duties on broker-dealers
handling retirement accounts.57
The SEC's inaction may be due to a subtle, but fundamental, shift in
the agency's view of its mission. Throughout much of its history, the Com-
mission has seen its purposes to be investor protection and the mainte-
nance of honest securities markets. In 1944, ten years after it was
established, the SEC stated that the enactment of the securities laws was
a response to "a need for legislation that would curb financial malpractice
and require those using and soliciting the use of other people's money to
conform at least to the minimum standards of fiduciaries or trustees - all
to the end that investors might be protected and the public interest fur-
thered."58 Fifteen years later, the SEC stated that the securities laws
"fundamentally aim to require that those who deal with the investments
of the American people observe high standards of conduct.
'59
54. Justin Baer & Andrew Ackerman, SEC Head: Raise the Bar for Advisers, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 18, 2015, at C5. Chair White's speech was made at a SIFMA conference in
Phoenix, AZ. Contrary to the usual practice, the speech was neither the subject of an SEC
press release nor displayed on the SEC website.
55. Peter J. Henning, SEC Faces Tough Challenge to Enhanced Broker Rule, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK, Mar. 23, 2015.
56. Remarks by President Barak Obama at the AARP Conference (Feb. 23, 2015)
(White House Press Release), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2015/02/23/remarks-president-aarp.
57. US Labor Department seeks public comment on proposal to protect consumers
from conflicts of interest in retirement advice (Apr. 14, 2015) (United States Department
of Labor News Release), available at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/EBSA2015
0655.htm.
58. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT: A TEN YEAR SURVEY 1934-
1944, at 2 (1944).
59. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, A 25 YEAR SUMMARY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1934-1959, at xiii (1949).
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In recent years, the SEC has added a new element to the statement of
its mission. The SEC website in 2015 states: "The mission of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain
fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation ....
The common interest of all Americans in a growing economy that pro-
duces jobs, improves our standard of living, and protects the value of our
savings means that all of the SEC's actions must be taken with an eye
toward promoting the capital formation that is necessary to sustain eco-
nomic growth."'60
It cannot be said that the SEC added capital formation to its stated
mission entirely on its own initiative. Congress has shown itself willing to
reduce investor protection in order to stimulate the economy. In 2012, in
the midst of the Great Recession, Congress enacted The Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act, known as the JOBS Act. 61 The JOBS Act exempts
certain new offerings of securities from the registration requirements of
the Securities Act of 1933 and enlarges certain other exemptions from the
securities laws. Its stated purpose is "to increase American job creation
and economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets
for emerging growth companies. ' 62 But despite Congress's focus on capi-
tal formation in this instance, it has never added capital formation to the
statutory mission of the SEC. To do so would have pernicious conse-
quences. If capital formation were to be regarded as an independent goal
of the SEC, it would be easy for the SEC to take the next step and con-
clude that protection of investors should be sacrificed to promote capital
formation.
In fact, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),
which regulates broker-dealers, expressly links regulation of the securities
markets to the general economic welfare of the nation, but it does so in a
very different way. Section 2 of the Exchange Act states that transactions
in securities are "effected with a national public interest which makes it
necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions ... "
and that "such transactions ... constitute an important part of interstate
commerce .... ",63 Section 2 goes on to say that the prices of securities
traded on the exchanges and the over-the-counter markets are suscepti-
ble to manipulation, and that "sudden and unreasonable fluctuations" in
securities prices can have a deleterious effect on the availability of credit,
the federal and state tax systems, and the banking system.64 Most impor-
tant, Section 2 states that such misconduct in the market causes "national
emergencies, which provide widespread unemployment and the disloca-
60. The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integ-
rity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, available at http://
www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#.VSVSLCj7W9Y (last visited Apr. 8, 2015) (emphasis
added).
61. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act ("JOBS Act"), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (previously H.R. 3606, 112th Cong.).
62. Id. at Preamble.
63. Exchange Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
64. Id.
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tion of trade, transportation, and industry .... ",65 Thus, the framers of the
Exchange Act made the important point that the regulation of broker-
dealers and the markets is needed to protect the national economy, not
that regulation should be balanced against the needs of the economy.
Events that occurred in recent memory illustrate the wisdom of the
framers of the Exchange Act seventy-five years earlier. In the first decade
of the twenty-first century, massive violations of the securities laws have
led to unemployment, poverty, and misery. People who had never partici-
pated in the securities markets were affected, along with investors. Ac-
cording to the national commission set up to inquire into the causes of the
crisis: "Panic and uncertainty in the financial system plunged the nation
into the longest and deepest recession in generations. The credit squeeze
in financial markets cascaded throughout the economy." 66
The SEC's failure to adopt rules under Section 913(g) is not surprising,
given the increased politicization of the agency. When I was an SEC staff
member in the 1960s, it was rare for the Commission to be divided on any
issue. Differences of opinion were usually resolved, and formal dissents
to Commission actions were almost unknown, even though the Commis-
sion is politically divided by statute. The Exchange Act requires that not
more than three of the five commissioners be members of the same politi-
cal party;67 in practice, the SEC chair and two other commissioners are
members of the same political party as the President and the remaining
two commissioners are members of the other party. These days, it is not
uncommon for the minority commissioners to dissent from important
regulatory decisions, although there have been occasions where the Chair
and the two minority commissioners agree and the two majority commis-
sioners dissent. The point is that in recent times, Commission decisions
that should be arrived at by considering what best serves the goals of
protecting investors and assuring honest and efficient markets are instead
treated as political decisions. The extent to which political considerations
have been a factor in the Commission's failure to implement Section
913(g) of Dodd-Frank is impossible to say, but it is a likely surmise.
What lies ahead? One can hope that by the time this article appears in
print the SEC will have ruled that broker-dealers and their employees are
fiduciaries who must place their customers' interests ahead of their own.
Whether or not this happens, it is time for the President and Congress to
65. Id. Section 2 is in the nature of a preamble to the Exchange Act. It may have been
inserted as an integral part of the statute because its framers wanted to establish the consti-
tutionality of Act under the Commerce Clause by linking malfeasance in the securities
markets to interstate commerce. The only substantive amendment of section 2 since its
original enactment is the addition in the 1970s of language relating to the establishment of
a national market system and of a national system for the clearing and settlement of
transactions.
66. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY RE.
PORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, AT 389 (JAN. 2011), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
67. Exchange Act, § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (2012).
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consider the systemic problems within the SEC. One useful step would be
for the President to appoint some SEC commissioners who have not
spent any substantial part of their careers in partisan politics or as attor-
neys or officers of firms regulated by the SEC. In the past, a number of
academics and long-time SEC staff members have been among the most
effective SEC chairs and commissioners. 68 Another step would be for
Congress to make clear that the overarching goal of the SEC is protection
of investors and maintenance of fair and orderly markets.
Finally, the culture of the securities business needs to change. For sev-
eral decades now, brokerage and investment banking firms have derived
much of their profit from proprietary trading, which often creates con-
flicts of interest with the activity of advising retail customers. As the
economist Martin Wolf recently put it: "Equally important [with distorted
incentives] ... are behavioral norms, such as the view that the primary
duty of bankers is to themselves not their customers."'69 Legal require-
ments can have only a limited impact on such a mental attitude. Accord-
ing to another economist: "Responsibility, to the man who feels it, is not
made clearer by legal subtleties. If he does not feel it, these legal subtle-
ties are humorously innocuous. ' 70 But if that responsibility is not felt,
then we must look to the law to instill it.
68. SEC Chairmen and Commissioners whose names come to mind are the academics
William 0. Douglas, Jerome Frank, William L. Cary, and Harvey Goldschmid; and the
longtime staff members Manuel Cohen and Irving Pollack. SEC Historical Summary of
Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, available at: https://www.sec.
gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm.
69. Martin Wolf, Make Policy for Real, not Ideal, Humans, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2014,
at 9.
70. ARTHUR S. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONs 81 (5th ed.
1953).
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